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Given global demand for new infrastructure, governments face substantial challenges 
in funding new infrastructure and simultaneously delivering Value for Money (VfM). 
The paper begins with an update on a key development in a new early/first-order 
procurement decision making model that deploys production cost/benefit theory and 
theories concerning transaction costs from the New Institutional Economics, in order 
to identify a procurement mode that is likely to deliver the best ratio of production 
costs and transaction costs to production benefits, and therefore deliver superior VfM 
relative to alternative procurement modes. In doing so, the new procurement model is 
also able to address the uncertainty concerning the relative merits of Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP) and non-PPP procurement approaches. The main aim of the paper 
is to develop competition as a dependent variable/proxy for VfM and a hypothesis 
(overarching proposition), as well as developing a research method to test the new 
procurement model. Competition reflects both production costs and benefits (absolute 
level of competition) and transaction costs (level of realised competition) and is a key 
proxy for VfM. Using competition as a proxy for VfM, the overarching proposition is 
given as: When the actual procurement mode matches the predicted (theoretical) 
procurement mode (informed by the new procurement model), then actual 
competition is expected to match potential competition (based on actual capacity). To 
collect data to test this proposition, the research method that is developed in this paper 
combines a survey and case study approach. More specifically, data collection 
instruments for the surveys to collect data on actual procurement, actual competition 
and potential competition are outlined. Finally, plans for analysing this survey data 
are briefly mentioned, along with noting the planned use of analytical pattern 
matching in deploying the new procurement model and in order to develop the 
predicted (theoretical) procurement mode. 
Keywords: infrastructure, procurement, research method, value. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reflecting population growth, migration and demographic changes, the OECD (2006) 
estimates global demand for new infrastructure at US $53 trillion between 2007-2030 
and in Australia, Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2010) has summarised 
estimates of required new infrastructure over the next 10 years from $455 billion to 
more than $770  billion (in 2007 terms).  This high demand for new infrastructure in 
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many countries, is presenting governments with severe challenges - not only in terms 
of funding and in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) but at the same time, 
in the delivery of new infrastructure whilst achieving Value for Money (VfM). One 
response to this challenge has been to develop Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and 
leverage private finance. Such that now, PPPs are considered to be a key mode of 
delivering new infrastructure in many countries, not least of which in Australia 
(KPMG and Infrastructure Australia 2010). However, the latest report from the 
National Audit Office in the UK notes amongst its key findings that "There is no clear 
data to conclude whether the use of PFI has led to demonstrably better or worse value 
for money than other forms of procurement" (2011: 6). This uncertainty surrounding 
the relative merits of PPPs versus other/non-PPP procurement modes is being 
exacerbated, for example again in the UK, by the lack of transparency and 
accountability in non-PPPs (Thomas 2011). There are grounds to consider that at least 
part of this situation applies outside of the UK. For example, in their review of all key 
international PPP evaluative studies and including studies in Australia, Hodge and 
Greve (2009) conclude that, at best, the case for PPPs is mixed. Seemingly, amongst 
the most authoritative current advice concerning the circumstances in which to select a 
PPP over other non-PPP modes remains at a very broad level and is given by the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Economics Affairs (2010) and based on the 
UK's substantial experience in delivering privately financed projects. That is, "the 
projects most suitable for private finance are those where the requirements can be 
clearly specified at the outset and which are of a size that consortia of private sector 
companies can take on their balance sheets". 
Against this background and uncertainty surrounding the use of PPPs and non-PPPs, it 
may not be any coincidence that current research and practice on procurement in 
construction/new infrastructure, is at a largely prescriptive level and lacks scientific 
maturity. Chang and Ive (2002) observe that since the 1970s there have been around 
900 procurement studies and that the multi-attribute utility approach (MAUA) has 
been a foremost approach amongst these studies. Teo, Bridge and Jefferies (2010) 
further explain the weaknesses of this current research and practice and which is 
dominated by variations of the multi-attribute utility approach (MAUA). From a 
scientific perspective, the key issue with MAUA is that the most appropriate 
procurement mode is being defined as a subset (that is, the relative merits of 
alternative procurement modes), or effectively in the same terms as the desired 
outcomes of the procurement mode and is, therefore, tautological. That is, if cause 
(read procurement mode) and effect (read performance outcomes from the 
asset/desired attributes) are defined in the same terms, or if cause or effect are defined 
as a subset of each other, then the relationship is circular and considered a truism that 
is not falsifiable. Whilst from a practical view, the major problem with MAUA is that 
key performance outcomes tend to focus on visible attributes at the start of the 
operations of the facility and as such revolve around short term production 
costs/benefits and largely ignore transaction costs. In total, this creates a narrow, or 
nominal approach to VfM, in so far as, VfM is being framed in terms of whether or 
not the selected procurement mode delivered the key production/performance 
outcomes visible at the start of operations. There are some signs that the dominant and 
Nobel prize winning theory concerning procurement from a microeconomic 
perspective (Transaction Cost Economics - TCE) and the dominant strategic 
management theory concerning procurement (Resource-Based Theory - RBT) are 
beginning to be deployed in construction related sectors (for example, Chang and Ive 
2007 on TCE). Much more significantly, however, the chief protagonists concerning 
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transactions costs and RBT are each pointing towards the integration of both 
perspectives in order to develop more accurate explanations of key aspects of 
procurement including the make-or-buy decision (Coase 1991; Williamson 1999; 
Barney 2002). Bridge and Tisdell (2004) and Bridge (2008) have successfully 
developed and empirically tested an integration of TCE and RBT concerning the 
make-or-buy decision. Furthermore, a number of leading scholars in the field of 
construction management and economics have supported Bridge and Tisdell's 
approach to integrating TCE and RBT - for example, Walker (2007) and Bröchner 
(2008; 2011), and Ball (2007: 221) considers that Bridge and Tisdell have developed 
an "ingenious" approach to drawing together the TCE and RBT literatures. Moreover, 
Bridge (2008) has also successfully developed and empirically tested TCE on the 
issue of the nature of the exchange relationship decision. These theories offer the 
facility to focus on conditions concerning the technological and physical attributes of 
the project, as well as the capabilities and competencies of government versus the 
private sector with respect to the project. The project conditions represent what is to 
be measured, whilst a priori theory guides how these conditions are measured and the 
manner by which resultant measurements informs procurement selection. Such that, 
the procurement selection is more likely to incorporate whole-of-life considerations 
and achieve a more efficient balance between production costs/benefits and 
transaction costs. Teo, Bridge and Jefferies (2010) have presented an initial schematic 
of the new first-order procurement decision making model that deploys production 
cost/benefit theory and theories concerning transaction costs from the New 
Institutional Economics (including Bridge and Tisdell's approach to integrating TCE 
and RBT), in order to identify a procurement mode that is likely to deliver the best 
ratio of production costs and transaction costs to production benefits, and therefore 
deliver superior VfM relative to alternative procurement modes. In doing so, the new 
model is also able to address the uncertainty concerning the relative merits of Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP) and non-PPP procurement approaches. The aim of this 
paper is to develop competition as a dependent variable/proxy for VfM and a 
hypothesis (overarching proposition), as well as developing a research method to test 
the new procurement model. First though, an update on a key development in the new 
procurement model is presented the next section. 
NEW PROCUREMENT DECISION MAKING MODEL 
Figure 1 illustrates a schematic of the new first-order procurement decision making 
model and which is described by Teo, Bridge and Jefferies (2010). The a priori 
component incorporating Bridge and Tisdell's integration of TCE and RBT occurs in 
Stage 1 Task B Make-or-Buy analysis. The decision whether to locate an activity 
within or outside the firm is known as the make-or-buy decision and it is this decision 
that determines the extent to which the firm is vertically integrated. In the context of 
this paper, the firm equates to the government and, therefore, this decision determines 
the vertical boundaries between the public sector and private sector in infrastructure 
projects. 
In Bridge and Tisdell's integration there are eight theoretical patterns, with each 
pattern comprising a total of six variables/measurements from TCE and RBT (three 
variables from each theory). The RBT measurements concern the relative capability 
and competence of government versus the private sector with respect to the activity 
and the TCE measurements concern physical and technological attributes of the 
project. In sum, the eight theoretical patterns reflect four logical reasons to 
make/internalise (Patterns 1 to 4a) or buy/ externalise (Patterns 4b to 7) an activity. By 
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applying the RBT and TCE measurements to each activity in the project an actual 
pattern for each activity is generated and which is then matched with the closest of the 
eight theoretical patterns. In doing so, this indicates whether the activity should be 
internalised or externalised to achieve greatest effectiveness and efficiency, including 
the most efficient allocation of risks. This approach to identifying the party best able 
to manage risks associated with an activity is a significant departure from current 
practice. That is, instead of seeking to identify and assess operational risks at an early 
developmental stage of the project, the focus is on resources held by government 
versus private sector and relative to each project activity as a means to more 
fundamentally and more reliably anticipate which party is best placed to manage risks 
associated with each activity. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of new first-order decision making model  
The key development in the new model since this was first described by Teo, Bridge 
and Jefferies (2010) concerns the first three tasks, namely, activity; make-or-buy; and 
market analysis. Previously, these activities were envisaged in sequence. The new 
procurement model is now developed in this paper to show these tasks as part of an 
iterative Stage 1. That is, having completed the first iteration in Stage 1, if any Pattern 
7 activities (associated with oligopoly; duopoly; or monopoly market structures) are 
surfaced and which have been generated on the basis of size or scale of work within 
the activity concerned, then a second iteration is undertaken involving breaking-up 
this activity(ies) to correspond with the capacity limits of the next lower tier of firms 
specialising in this activity. This would then leave only Pattern 7 activities arising out 
of rare and costly to imitate technology. Iterations within Stage 1 address the "size" 
issue mentioned by the House of Lords Select Committee on Economics Affairs 
(2010) as one of the two factors that are observed as key determinants in terms of 
whether or not a project could be suitable as a PPP. With regard to the other factor 
mentioned by the House of Lords Select Committee and which concerns 
predictability, activities assigned as a Pattern 4b activity and the residual Pattern 7 
activities from Stage 1 (with a very high potential for hold-up arising from a very high 
level of asset specificity and very high level of uncertainty/unpredictability) are the 
focus in Stage 2 Task A Bundling Analysis. Here, Pattern 4b and Pattern 7 activities 
are excluded from bundling and on the basis that government is better placed to 
manage potential hold-up in these activities if it directly engages and/or collaborates 
with the private sector firms supplying these activities. 
In summary, the new first-order procurement decision making model addresses key 
matters concerning risk allocation; size and flexibility/predictability as part of 
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identifying opportunities to bundle design, construction, operations and maintenance, 
as well as addressing the nature of the contractual exchange with each private sector 
party/entity engaged to deliver the project/parts of the project and, in doing so, the 
new model proposes a mind-set change in current research that revolves around 
MAUA and the current practice of selecting the procurement mode, as depicted in 
Figure 2. That is, from an approach which begins with a dominant performance 
outcome visible at the opening day of an asset (top row of boxes in Figure 2) to a new 
approach in which the analysis commences with the conditions pertaining to the 
project (bottom row of boxes in Figure 2) and which opens-up the opportunity to 
deliver superior VfM and in relative terms - as opposed to VfM in nominal terms.  
 
Figure 2: New model and VfM in relative terms 
The next section develops competition as a dependent variable/proxy for VfM and a 
hypothesis (overarching proposition) as steps towards developing a research method 
to test the new procurement model. 
DEVELOPING COMPETITION AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
As previously indicated, the House of Lords Select Committee on Economics Affairs 
(2010) consider competition to be a fundamental driver of value, in terms of 
recognising size as key determinant of the viability of a PPP. That is, size affects the 
number of willing suppliers or bidders and this affect is exaggerated in the current 
economic climate with constraints on credit. The absolute level of competitive tension 
will not only create downward pressure on prices but also facilitate the crystallisation 
of innovations that impinge on the time, cost and quality of the project and which will 
influence the overall performance of the project across its life cycle. More 
fundamentally, the extent to which actual observed competition matches potential 
competition (based on actual capacity), or realised competition, is a measure of the 
success of the selected procurement mode in terms of the level of efficiency achieved 
in allocating project risks; configuring bundles of externalised activities; and in 
determining the nature of the external exchange relationship with each externalised 
bundle/contract. In this way, competition reflects both production costs and benefits 
(absolute competition) and transaction costs (realised competition) and is a key proxy 
for VfM.  As illustrated in Figure 3, competition is developed as a dependent 
variable/proxy for VfM in the overarching proposition designed in this paper for 
testing the new procurement model and which is given as: 
When the actual procurement mode matches the predicted procurement mode 
(informed by the new first-order decision making model), then actual competition is 
expected to match potential competition (based on actual capacity). 
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The position that Box A matches Box B and at the same time in the project concerned 
Box C matches Box D, shows that theory and practice are mutually supportive and 
that procurement is mobilising full capacity and thus generating maximum 
competition and enhancing VfM. 
 
Figure 3: Overarching proposition 
This position assumes that tendering policy and practice is meeting the public interest. 
That is, tendering policy and practice neither gratuitously encourages nor unduly 
discourages contractors' willingness to bid for public sector projects - as against 
private sector projects. Alterative positions to that shown in Figure 3 in which 
government either over-realises competition or under-realises competition, offer 
opportunities to develop theory and/or practice and explore the effect of tendering on 
competition. 
Over-realised competition: Box D > Box C 
In this case, more contactors than expected are expressing a willingness to bid for new 
public sector infrastructure projects; and notwithstanding the extent to which the 
overall market is overheated or there exists spare capacity and when: 
 Box A (actual procurement) = Box B (predicted procurement) either: 
o Contractors may perceive better than usual odds of bid success and/or 
better than normal project profit because of the manner by which the 
project is tendered; or  
o Notwithstanding the manner by which the project is tendered, 
contractors may be predicting a near term decline in private sector 
work relative to public sector work.  
 Box A (actual procurement) ≠ Box B (predicted procurement) either:  
o This situation needs careful investigation to determine whether theory 
(new procurement model) can be informed by policy and practice or 
whether contractors may perceive better than usual odds of bid success 
and/or better than normal project profit because of the manner by 
which the project is tendered and/or may perceive better than normal 
project profit because of the manner by which the project is procured; 
or  
o Notwithstanding the manner by which the project is tendered, as well 
as notwithstanding the manner by which the project is procured 
contractors may be predicting a near term decline in private sector 
work relative to public sector work. 
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Under-realised competition: Box D < Box C 
In this case, less contactors than expected are expressing a willingness to bid for new 
public sector infrastructure projects; and notwithstanding the extent to which the 
overall market is overheated or there exist spare capacity and when: 
 Box A (actual procurement) = Box B (predicted procurement) either:  
o Contractors may perceive less than usual odds of bid success and/or 
less than normal profit because of the manner by which the project is 
tendered; or  
o Notwithstanding the manner by which the project is tendered, 
contractors may be predicting a near term decline in public sector work 
relative to private sector work.  
 Box A (actual procurement) ≠ Box B (predicted procurement) either:  
o This situation also needs careful investigation to determine whether 
this time procurement policy and practice can be informed by theory 
(new procurement model) or whether contractors perceive less than 
usual odds of bid success and/or less than normal project profit because 
of the manner by which the project is tendered; or 
o Notwithstanding the manner by which the project is tendered, as well 
as notwithstanding the manner by which the project is procured 
contractors may be predicting a near term decline in public sector work 
relative to private sector work. 
 
Therefore, under the conditions in which there is an absence of an expected near term 
decline in either public sector work or private sector work, this research also presents 
an opportunity to surface the effect of insufficiently strict tendering policy and 
practice - in the cases in which projects over-realise competition and the effect of 
overly strict tendering policy and practice - in the cases in which projects under-
realise competition. The next section outlines a overall research method using a 
combination of survey and case study methods designed to generate data to test the 
overarching proposition and, in doing so, develop and test the new first-order decision 
making model - as illustrated in Figure 4. 
DEVELOPING A RESEARCH METHOD 
Information Requested Schedule (Box A: Actual Procurement and Box D: Actual 
Competition) 
The first draft was created on 18th March 2010, and finalised on 26th July 2010 after 
a further of three drafts. In this process, pilot government respondents’ comments 
were considered and the schedule was refined to reduce confusion concerning 
terminology and to streamline the questions and scope of the research. A total of ten 
pilot meetings, including tele-conference meetings were held with government 
representatives in the five Australian states in the study (NSW; QLD: SA; VIC; and 
WA). These initial pilot meetings also helped to determine health and road sectors as 
the focus of the study and projects over $50million and in which expressions of 
interest have been established between July 2005 and June 2010. The eventual 
schedule comprises three main sections namely, project details; project scope and 
procurement; and tendering approach. The online version of the schedule was 
designed and developed concurrently, using on-line survey software ("Keysurvey") 
and which allows respondents to complete the schedule in a password protected 
survey. After pre-testing the on-line version, the schedule was formally launched on 
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30th August 2010 and 87 project schedules have been submitted and at the time of 
writing face-to-face meetings with the government project managers who submitted 
the schedules are being completed. The objective of the meetings is to fill in the gaps 
in the submitted schedules and to gather more specific information pertaining to risk 
analysis and procurement selection guidelines particular to each project and in each 
state.  
 
Figure 4: Research methods 
Questionnaire (Box C: Potential Competition) 
The first draft of the questionnaire was created on 18th March 2010, and following 
piloting was practically completed on 28th September 2010. After further discussions 
with government and contracting organisations, the final questionnaire was completed 
11th April 2011 and issue commenced 5th May 2011 to 187 contractors capable of 
delivering projects in excess of $50million across five states in Australia. In total, 10 
versions of the questionnaire were created. Each version has specific wording 
pertaining to each of the two infrastructure sectors and each of the five states 
(although each version contains the same questions). Again, an on-line approach was 
use (Keysurvey – on-line survey software). The questions are designed to map the 
potential level of competition level in health and road major infrastructure, using 
sector and Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) analyses. The final section of the 
questionnaire concerns the effects of tendering on bidding. At the time of writing, the 
process of following-up responses has recently commenced. 
Case Studies (Box B: Predicted Procurement) 
Data concerning predicted procurement (Box B) is planned to be generated from case 
studies. The aim is to undertake in the order of 15 case studies selected in order allow 
analytical generalisation (Yin 2009). That is, one or two health projects and one or 
two road projects will be selected in each of the five states in the study in Australia. 
The analytical technique of pattern matching will be used to analyse multiple sources 
of data in each case study and which is designed to generate the RBT and TCE 
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patterns and pursuance of deploying the new first-order procurement decision making 
model. 
Planned approach to analysing of data 
Once the selected projects have been case studied and the predicted procurement 
developed for each project by deploying the new procurement model, then the largest 
construction contact and procurement mode for each project can be identified. Next, 
using data from the questionnaire a view will be developed concerning the potential 
competition to this construction contact such that this can then be compared with the 
actual expressions of interest/actual competition from data in the information 
requested schedule and which also gives the actual overall approach to procurement 
(including details concerning the actual approach to procuring the largest construction 
contact within the project). In each case study, the position/alternative position with 
respect to the overarching hypothesis can then be identified and the new first-order 
procurement decision making model developed and tested. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented a key development in a new first-order procurement decision 
making model and which addresses the "size" issue mentioned by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Economics Affairs (2010) in respect of one of the two factors 
that are observed as key determinants in terms of whether or not a project could be 
suitable as a PPP. The paper has also developed competition as a dependent 
variable/proxy for VfM and a hypothesis (overarching proposition), as well as a 
research method designed to test the new procurement model. In summary, the new 
model is designed to be used to guide procurement selection at an early stage and 
before a full business case is developed for the project concerned. In doing so, the 
model may indentify PPPs that may have been otherwise overlooked. The model does 
not address directly tendering but in testing the model it's envisaged that issues 
concerning tendering policy and practice will be surfaced in way not seen before. 
Finally, the questionnaire to contractors will generate data concerning capacity and 
competition and which straddles both sides of the GFC. Therefore, this will be a 
unique data set with extreme points and from which future interpolation of capacity 
and using general economic climate as the guide may be possible. In addition to this, 
it's envisaged that the SCP map generated from the contractors' questionnaire will be 
the most comprehensive description of this market in Australia to date and will help 
inform microeconomic policy and industry reform.  
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